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Abstract: This paper will present drawing as a knowledge generating activity that integrates
perception,  action  and  cognition.   It  will  do  so  with  reference  to  a  range  of  theory  that
champions the epistemic significance of perception in knowledge generation, with particular
reference to  contemporary  theories of  ‘situated cognition’,  as well  as the related work of
contemporary theorists like Mark Johnson and Alva Noë.  
The  absorption  of  art  and  design  education  within  the  broader  university  presents  many
advantages, however a principal drawback is a phenomenon the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
recognises  as  the  exclusion  of  métier,  that  is  “the  material  determinations  of  symbolic
practices”  –  including drawing –  from such “scholastic  universes”  (Bourdieu,  2000,  p.20).
This,  it  will  be  argued,  is  a  key  factor  in  what  James  Elkins  describes  as  “the
incommensurability of studio art production and university life” (Elkins, 2009, p.128).    
Perhaps due to its neophyte status within the university, the discipline of art and design has
been remarkably ineffective in countering the negative repercussions of this phenomenon.
This paper will argue that it is magnified by a tendency – as outlined by Johnson – within the
mainstream of  Anglo-American analytical  philosophy  to  “retain  an exclusive  focus  on the
conceptual/propositional as the only meaning that mattered for our knowledge of the world”
(Johnson, 2007, p.9).  This view presents language, and textual argument in particular, as
representing the ‘gold standard’  in  terms of  a model  for knowledge generation within  the
university.  By  way  of  counterweight,  this  paper  will  present  ‘situated  cognition’,  a  theory
indebted  to  both  Phenomenology  and  American  Pragmatism,  both  of  these  philosophical
movements run counter to mainstream epistemology.  In short  this paper will,  in  this way,
make a case for the rehabilitation of drawing as an important way of knowing. 
Keywords: Drawing; Perception; ‘Situated Cognition’; Epistemology; Phenomenology;
INTRODUCTION
The absorption of art and design education within the broader university presents many 
advantages, however a principal drawback is a phenomenon the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
recognises as present at the inception of Western higher education in art and design, It 
hinges on the disparagement of “productive labour” by comparison with “symbolic labour” 
(Bourdieu, 2000, pp.20-21).  
Bourdieu (2000) refers to a period of “the autonomization of the artistic field”, that saw the
founding of the Florentine  Accademia del  Disegno  (1563).   The naming of  this institution
represented an assertion of a new found confidence in the visual arts, this however revealed
two distinct motivations; the title of academy was intended to associate the institution with the
high status of the liberal arts, while simultaneously to disassociate it from association with the
manual pursuits of the artists workshop.  As Quiviger observes the Academy’s founding:
 
…mark[s] the first steps in the progressive passage from the workshop, based on the
archaic  system  of  apprenticeship,  repetitive  practice  and  oral  transmission,  to  the
academy,  an  institution  independent  of  the  guilds  and  associated  with  literary  and
philosophical pursuits”. (Quiviger, 2002, p.59) 
Unfortunately this instinct to disassociate from the manual production of the workshops 
represents a remarkably resilient impulse, one as we shall see, that is still evident in higher 
education in art and design today. 
Bourdieu characterized this process of “autonomization” as involving “a repression of the 
material determinations of symbolic practices” – including the physical, manual and situated 
aspects of the practice of drawing, whereby, “painterly activity progressively asserted itself as 
a specific activity, irreducible to a simple labour of material production, ... consequently 
claiming the status accorded to the noblest intellectual activities” (Bourdieu, 2000, p.20). The 
social dimension is emphasised, Bourdieu suggests that ultimately this impulse stems from an
ingrained “academic aristocratism” which effected an exclusion from “scholastic universes” of 
base means and métier (Bourdieu, 2000, p.25).  In this regard Bermingham, (2000) points to 
“the problematic social status” of the arts in this period: “stigmatised as handicrafts and 
institutionalised within the medieval guild system, they appeared as skills better suited to the 
artisan than to the courtier” (Bermingham, 2000, p.4). And Bourdieu sees this as part of a 
bigger picture wherein he sees evidence of a disparagement of “productive labour” within both
academia and the broader culture: 
The slow, painful process of sublimation through which pictorial practice asserted 
itself as a purely symbolic activity denying its material conditions of possibility has a 
clear affinity with the process of differentiation of productive labour symbolic labour 
that proceeded at the same time. (Bourdieu, 2000, pp.20-21)
Dewey points out that, in the period of the Academy’s founding “the aristocratic tradition which
looked down upon material things and upon the senses and the hands was still mighty” 
(Dewey, 1930, p.329).  The term “disegno” was therefore also a signal, calculated to lend 
kudos to the enterprise. The notion of disegno was understood as an overarching “theoretical 
principle unifying the practice of painting, sculpture and architecture” (Quiviger, 2002, p.54).  
Conceived of in Neo-Platonic idealist terms, disegno had a dual aspect.  Firstly it referred to 
the physical, embodied and situated aspects associated with, in Bourdieu’s terms, “productive
labour”. Secondly, theories of disegno laid perhaps greater emphasis on the intellectual 
aspect of the art of drawing.  Disegno was understood as providing access to what Georgio 
Vasari (1511-1574) described as “the concept (concetto) held in the mind and of that which, 
to say the same thing, has been imagined in the intellect and fabricated in the idea” (Quiviger,
2002, p.54).  Such “idea’s” where merely reflections of Platonic “forms”, Christianised, as 
befitted the times, as accessing  ‘ideas’ within “the Devine Intellect” (Langmuir, & Lynton, 
2000, p.200).  By associating the Academy with the study of disegno the founders (Vasari 
among them) where deliberately signalling that theirs was an institution dedicated to 
intellectual and theoretical pursuit as opposed to the empirical knowledge of the workshop. 
It is not difficult to detect dualism at play here and this is reflected in the palpable tensions 
that arose regarding definitions of the term disegno at the time.  Vasari’s conception of the 
term was relatively holistic, although he recognized the specific intellectual and embodied 
aspects of disegno, he did not see them as entirely separate, and his treatment tended to 
integrate them.  Indeed Federico Zuccaro (1542-1609) criticized Vasari for this very 
conflation.  Zuccaro by contrast emphasized separation.  He identified two distinct species of 
disegno: disegno interno and disegno esterno. For him disegno interno represented drawing’s
superior intellectual, conceptual and idealist aspect, which was favourably contrasted with 
disegno esterno. Disegno esterno referred to drawing’s practical, embodied and situated 
cognitive aspects whose depreciation was also compounded by negative association with 
mimesis.  All of these latter characteristics Zuccaro considered “secondary and necessarily 
inferior” (Goldstein, 1996, pp.31-32).  Furthermore, Zuccaro regarded these two species as 
entirely separate and independent intelligences, disegno interno viewed positively as 
concerning the universal while disegno esterno was an engagement with the particular – a 
negative connotation in Neo-Platonic philosophical terms (Goldstein, 1996, p.32). 
In hindsight however, as we shall see, Vasari's conflated view appears in a positive light, as 
integrated and holistic, when viewed from the point of view of contemporary understandings, 
currently emerging within ‘situated cognition’ theory a field of research at the intersection of 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind.  
DRAWING: A SITE OF CONTENTION
We can see, then, that in the sixteenth century drawing was the site of no little social conflict, 
even socio-political quarrel.  As disegno, it was also the subject of much constructive and 
destructive ambiguity as David Rosand recognizes: 
For all the philosophical rhetoric brought to the discussion by intellectually ambitious 
academics like Zuccaro ... a basic truth remains; disegno is fraught with contradiction 
and ambivalence, located as it is at the very boundary between mind, hand, idea and 
form. (Rosand, 2002, p.60)
This reflects a fissure that Bourdieu envisages running through modern higher education in 
art and design from its inception, with its origins in social struggle, as he poignantly asserts, 
“through oppositions like that between theory and practice, the whole social order is present 
in the very way that we think about that order” (Bourdieu 2000, p.83).  Goldstein suggests that
the impact of this disparagement or practice relative to theory is remarkably persistent 
throughout the period from the founding of the Florentine Academy at least up to the 
Bauhaus, something he characterizes as “a problematising of the relationship between theory
and practice, and ... a ‘deconstruction’ of theory in a resolutely dialectical engagement with it 
as something demonstrably different from practice” (Goldstein, 1996, p.24). 
OUR PROBLEM WITH PRODUCTION
With regard to the current situation, James Elkins considers that the place of art production 
within the contemporary university is still an “immensely difficult” problem. He cites, in this 
regard, the disjuncture between the positive attitude within academia toward theorizing of the 
“finished” products of art practice, which he contrasts with the comparatively negative stance 
toward the “experience of making [in terms of] its exact pedagogy, its methods, knacks and 
skills” that which is “prior to any talk about art” (Elkins, 2009, p.128, my emphasis).  Elkins 
sees this difficulty as contributing to what he starkly describes as the “incommensurability of 
studio art production and university life” (Elkins, 2009, p.128). 
As we have already witnessed the Renaissance conception of disegno can be a useful point 
of departure. It represents an early recognition of the singular epistemological status of 
drawing as a means of both conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge generation. The 
intellectual excitement and artistic confidence of the Italian Renaissance opened a space 
where the significance of intelligent making was given unprecedented social and academic 
recognition despite more reactionary tendencies. This is particularly evident in Vasari’s 
holistic impulse, to integrate the practical and intellectual aspects of disegno. His vision 
respected both the complexity and the ambiguity of the concept of disegno and recognized 
drawing’s particular epistemological significance.  Claudia Mareis, gives an elegant account, 
in the context of contemporary practice, of this epistemic aspect: 
…the sketches of the artist or plans of the architect bring complex conceptual ideas 
onto paper by means of simple, economic lines: they are, in a manner of speaking, 
materialized figurations of the idea.  Drawing has more than just an executive function
(as in the merely mechanical translation of a finished idea onto paper), for the act of 
sketching or drawing itself generates knowledge. In turn, this knowledge can 
influence our imagination and modify, modulate or reshape the design during the 
process of drawing itself.  Accordingly, in the act of drawing, as well as in the finished 
drawing, the intellectual activity of designing and the manual execution of these ideas
are inextricably linked and subject to a reciprocal influence. (Mareis, 2007, pp. 2-3 my
emphasis) 
When these integrated aspects of drawing, “the intellectual and the manual”, are combined 
and work in tandem in the way Mareis describes, drawing becomes knowledge generating. 
Mareis’ description of the reciprocal to and fro of the process also recognizes the significance 
of an aspect of the drawing process that the remainder of this paper will to a degree focus on;
the feedback loop – from mental concept, to sketch, to mental concept to sketch and so on 
and so forth.  Feedback is something pivotal with regard to an understanding of the epistemic 
nature of the drawing process.   The remainder of this paper will also focus on a model for 
how this happens primarily with reference to ‘situated cognition’ theory and other related sets 
of theory at the interface of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. 
‘SITUATED COGNITION’
The twin tenets of “situated cognition” are firstly, that knowledge is a form of action and 
secondly that so defined knowledge is indubitably situated in physical, social and indeed 
cultural terms. In this regard it presents a view that counters the dualisms of “productive” 
versus “symbolic labour” and of conceptual thought versus enactive, situated and embodied 
thought. 
Shaun Gallagher points out that in his understanding of cognition Dewey is a precursor of 
‘situated cognition’ theory, particularly with regard to the emphasis he lays on the dynamics 
between agent and environment. The distinction between conceptual thought and “productive 
labour” or as Gallagher frames it, “the separation of mental experience from hands-on 
physical manipulation of the environment” was, for Dewey “both a philosophical and a social 
problem” (Gallagher, 2009, p.39-40).  This is because for Dewey, as Gallagher explains, 
“cognition is a form of action and not a relation between a thinking that goes on in the mind 
and a behavior that goes on in the world” (Gallagher, 2009, p.39-40). In short, Dewey’s view 
is prescient regarding the ‘situated cognition’ denial of Cartesian and other entrenched 
dualism.   
Robbins and Aydede (2009, p.3) provide a useful description of the three principal component
theses of ‘situated cognition’, namely, the embodiment thesis, the embedding thesis and the 
extension thesis: 
First, cognition depends not just on the brain but also on the body (the embodiment
thesis). Second, cognitive activity routinely exploits structure in the natural and social
environment (the embedding thesis). Third, the boundaries of cognition extend beyond
the boundaries of individual organisms (the extension thesis). (Robbins and Aydede,
2009, p.3) 
For lack of space this paper will not focus on the first of these theses beyond referencing 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, (another forerunner of ‘situated cognition’ theory) who neatly 
encapsulated the essence of the “embodiment thesis” within the context of this discussion:  
…we cannot imagine how a mind could paint.  It is by lending his [or her] body to the 
world that the artist changes the world into paintings.  To understand these 
transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body … that body which is 
an intertwining of vision and movement. (Merleau-Ponty, in Rosand, 2002, p.221) 
It is evident that ‘situated cognition’ theory presents a holistic epistemology that is particularly 
amenable to the truth claims of tacit, and embodied ways of knowing, as epitomised by 
drawing. ‘Situated cognition’ theory allows us to see the situated and embodied aspects of 
métier in a new light.  Indeed, making, and particularly drawing, seen in this light, might be 
regarded as a knowledge generating activity par excellence.
FEEDBACK
This view is supported by Bredo who presents drawing as a model for the kind of knowledge 
of and in the world presented by ‘situated cognition’ theory. In emphasising the integration of 
agent with environment, his understanding reflects Robbins and Aydede’s “embedding 
thesis”: 
Drawing is a drawn out affair: one draws, responds to what one has drawn, draws 
more, and so on. The goals for the continuation of the drawing change as it evolves and
different effects become possible. Acting with the environment in this way contrasts with
acting on it, because it presupposes that it will turn round and alter oneself in return... 
(Bredo, 1994)
We are here presented with the idea of the draftsman/woman not as a passive agent within 
the environment, as Dewey termed it, “like a cherry in a bowl” (Dewey, in Bredo, 1994), 
neither however is the environment understood as passive. ‘Situated cognition’ theory denies 
subject/object dualism, which presents a metaphysical chasm between the human ‘subject’ 
and the environment ‘object’. Indeed Mark Johnson – in a radical take on the “embedding 
thesis” – suggests that, “subjects and objects are really just abstractions from the interaction 
of organism-environment-transactions” (Johnson, 2007, p.67).  This, as we can see from 
Bredo’s description gives a whole new insight into how drawing might be regarded from an 
epistemological standpoint. If we deny the subject/object cognitive model we remove a 
bulwark of Cartesian epistemology as epitomised by single-point perspective, what Bourdieu 
calls “the point of view on which no point of view can be taken” (Bourdieu, 2003, p.22).  We 
thereby make way for an alternative view of drawing as a “situated” indeed “embedded” form 
of cognition and knowledge generation with, as Bredo recognises, feedback at its core.
Vasari was aware of the role of feedback as an essential aspect of drawing.  Gombrich (1982)
relates how Vasari admonished Giorgione’s dispensing with preparatory drawings and what 
he saw as the Venetian artist’s foolish failure to understand:   
 
…that it is necessary to anyone who wants to arrive at a good composition and to 
adjust his inventions, first to draw them on paper so as to see how it all goes together.  
The reason is that the mind can neither perceive nor perfectly imagine inventions within
itself unless it opens up and shows its conceptions to corporal eyes which aid it to 
arrive at a good judgement. (Gombrich, 1982, p.227) 
This insight chimes with both Mareis’s and Bredo’s allusions to the centrality of feedback in 
that process of drawing.   It chimes too with John Berger’s description of his own drawing 
process. Berger describes the cut and thrust of life drawing, how as he puts it, each line he 
draws on the page “reforms the figure on the paper, and at the same time it redraws the 
image in my mind, [and] what is more, the drawn line redraws the model, because it changes 
my capacity to perceive” (John Berger in Pallasmaa, 2009, p.92).  Indeed the intensity of this 
process enhances its ‘situated’ aspect to a point where the draftsman/woman often enters a 
meditative state, a ‘zone’, as it were, wherein the sense of the drawing subject and drawn 
object may appear to dissolve. This produces a kind of ‘indwelling’, in which the level of 
engagement is such that consciousness of time, for example, can melt away, as Berger 
explains, “you lose your sense of time when drawing. You are so concentrated on scales of 
space” (Berger, 2011, p.7).
DRAWING AS THINKING
Through an altered epistemological conception, founded in ‘situated cognition’ drawing can be
re-envisaged as a manner of thinking, indeed Gallagher explains that with regard to ‘situated 
cognition’ theory: 
To conceive of the mind as a Cartesian thinking thing is to posit something over and 
above the situation in which thinking occurs. Thinking is not something that happens in 
a mind, as an attribute or quality that belongs to a subject who is isolated from the 
world; it is an activity or event in the world. (Gallagher, 2009, pp.38-39)
 ‘Situated cognition’ is, as Gallagher points out, philosophically indebted to both 
Phenomenology and American Pragmatism, particularly to Dewey’s epistemology, as well as 
the Phenomenology of philosophers like Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger.  Heidegger, 
for example, insists that, “the kind of care that manipulates things and puts them to use... has 
its own kind of knowledge” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 95).  Heidegger also sees the dominance of 
Cartesian objectivism in Western thought as limiting, because, as he puts it, there is a 
“deficiency” in knowledge when it is at a remove from the world – when it is divorced from, or 
“holds back” from “producing and manipulating and the like” (Heidegger, 1962, p.88).
THE EXTENDED MIND
Robbins and Aydede’s “extension thesis” presents perhaps one of the most exciting insights 
for a renewed epistemological understanding of drawing.  They reference in this regard the 
work of Clark and Chalmers who in a seminal text “The Extended Mind” (1998), propose a 
number of concepts most notably the notion of “extended cognition” and the constituent 
concept of “active externalism” and ”epistemic action”. 
“Active externalism” is a radically “situated” and “enactive” view of cognition.  As Alva Noë 
explains, it is predicated on the notion that “the environment can drive and so partially 
constitute cognitive processes” (Noë. 2006, p.411).  In their example a diary or a notebook 
may be seen as an extension of someone’s mind, as Clark and Chalmers explain, when 
someone uses something external like a notebook to record and/or process information then,
… the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system… Our thesis is that 
this sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it
is wholly in the head. (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p.13) 
What is true of a notebook holds just as well (perhaps better) for a sketchbook.  And it is 
evident that Clark and Chalmer’s description chimes with the understanding of the importance
of the feedback loop in drawing that we encountered in Vasari’s, Mareis’, Bredo’s and 
Berger’s descriptions.   Clark and Chalmers coin the term “epistemic action”, to describe, 
actions occurring within the environment that use elements of that environment whether walls,
computer screens, notebooks or sketchpads. These actions have been described as, “actions
performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally” (Kirsh and 
Maglio, 1994, p.513). In this we hear an echo of Vasari’s insight, outlined earlier, about 
externalising ideas and testing them through exposure “to corporal eyes”.     Most significantly
Clark and Chalmers argue for an extension of “epistemic credit” to external entities like 
notebooks and sketchbooks and by extension to other tools (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, 
p.11).  The extension of “epistemic credit” to actions involving the use of such tools – actions 
like drawing – seems a logical extension of their argument. 
ENACTIVE PERCEPTION
Let us turn briefly to another theory that lends weight to an argument for an extension of 
“epistemic credit” to the practice of drawing.  Gallagher suggests that Dewey’s concept of 
cognition also supports “enactive cognition,” which Gallagher describes as “the idea that 
perception and thinking are fully integrated with motor action” (Gallagher, 2009, p.39).  In 
other words perception is understood as not merely dependent on, but is “constituted by” our 
possession of sensorimotor knowledge (Noë, 2004, p.2).  According to this theory, perception,
in terms of vision, is an interaction with the environment more analogous to a blind person 
using their stick than to conventional understandings that appeal to “internal representation” 
or the “pictures in the mind” paradigm.   As Alva Noë explains: 
 
…the content of an experience is not given all at once, as is the content of a picture.  
Rather, the content is given only thanks to the perceiver’s exercise of knowledge of 
sensorimotor contingencies. The content of experience isn’t really given at all – it is 
enacted. Perceptual experience, according to this enactive approach, is itself a 
temporally extended activity, an activity of skill-based exploration of the environment.  
(Noë, 2008) 
The theory of “enactive perception” is Noë recognizes, highly amenable to accommodating 
the truth claims of the kind of enactive, embodied and situated experiential knowledge native 
to creative practices (Noë, 2008). Drawing can be seen to employ the kind of active skill-
based searching, reaching and testing that Noë recognises in everyday looking.  In this way 
drawing’s claim to represent a heightened form of perception finds support in Noë’s theory. 
CONCLUSION
Finally and in conclusion, a number of theorists have suggested that perception is a kind of 
thought (Noë, 2004, Johnson, 2007, Arnheim, 1969). Noë claims that both "perception and 
perceptual consciousness" are most usefully understood, as "types of thoughtful, 
knowledgeable activity" (2004, p.3).  Mark Johnson (2007) supports this view, suggesting that
such enactive perception – indeed all perception – ought be regarded as a form of thinking.  
He enlists the support of “Dewey's continuity principle” which viewed the operations of “mind” 
as having evolved through the development of increasingly complex “sensorimotor” activity.  
From this Johnson posits that, “there is no radical ontological or epistemological gap 
separating perceiving from thinking” (Johnson, 2007, p.228). This insight counters the 
persistent dualism that sees percept and concept as representing inexorably separate 
aspects of our engagement with the world, indeed Rudolf Arnheim points out that “in the 
perception of shape lies the beginning of concept formation” (Arnheim, 1969, p. 27). These 
insights support an understanding of drawing which frames it as a way of thinking.
Just as Vasari’s understanding of disegno recognized, in a holistic way, the complex 
integration of conceptual and perceptual cognition which lent the actions of drawing 
unprecedented epistemological value, so too, in a contemporary context does ‘situated 
cognition’ theory extend epistemic credit to drawing as an enactive, situated and embodied 
way of thinking and of knowledge generation, one with integrated conceptual and perceptual 
dimensions.   
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